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"How can anyone call me a terrorist? ... Terrorism means causing
injuries to innocent people. There were no injuries at Reykjavik. We've
never injured anyone.
We saved the lives of 200 whales by sinking those ships. To call me a
terrorist means you are placing private property above the sanctity of
life." 1
In the wake of the 1992 Glasgow meeting of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC), the withdrawal of Iceland from this regulatory structure,
and the threatened formation of a North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commis-
sion, 2 it is particularly appropriate to consider the unacceptable face of
marine environmentalism. The sixteenth century was rife with stories of the
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1. Graham Rockingham, Man hunts whalers, not whales, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI,
November 15, 1986.
2. Toby Moore, 10-year ban on whaling collapses, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 30, 1992, at 2,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. This body is to include Norway, the Faroes, Greenland and Iceland
and "could assume powers to grant licenses and quotas for the commercial exploitation of whales.... -
Id.
1
Menefee: The Case of the Castle John, or Greenbeard the Pirate?: Environme
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993
2 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Barbarossa (or "Redbeard") brothers, renegade Algerian corsairs,3 the
eighteenth century with the exploits of the indomitable Blackbeard. 4 Will the
twentieth century see the zenith of a new form of piracy and the advent of
"Greenbeard" the pirate?
PIRACY AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN INTRODUCTION
In considering the interface between piracy and environmentalism, we
may see the development of international law at work. The crime of piracy
is as old as the Code of Hammurabi,5 while classical sources are rife with
mentions of the practice. 6 It is of almost universal occurrence, spanning the
centuries and many cultures; "[t]here were Dalmatian pirates, Viking raiders,
Japanese Wako (or Chinese Wok'ou), sea rovers who operated in the
Indonesian archipelago, and Arab pirates in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. "I
Along with this "universality," however, came competing definitions of the
crime. Individuals such as Francis Drake, Henry Morgan, John Paul Jones,
Jean Lafitte, Thomas Hogg, and Henrique Galvao-each a patriot in his
way-have all been termed "pirates" by others.' While each country has its
own municipal laws as to what constitutes piracy, even international law on
the subject has not been static. Not only do cases, treaties, and the opinions
of commentators play an important role in this process, but so does the
practice of states. This is not to suggest that the evolution of the concept of
piracy is necessarily manifest or that reasonable men and women, much less
3. See annotation, Barbarossa, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 220 (1991); Barbarossa in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 886 (15th ed. 1992).
4. See J.K.L. [John Knox Laughton], Teach or Thatch, Edward, in 19 SIR LESLIE STEPHEN AND SIR
SIDNEY LEE, THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 481-82 (reprint ed. 1973); DANIEL DEFOE, A
GENERAL HISTORY OF THE ROBBERIES AND MURDERS OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS PYRATES [sic] 15-66(1972) (noting that "Captain Teach, assumed the cognomen of Black-beard, from that large quantity of
hair which, like a frightful meteor, covered his whole face and frightened America more than any comet
that has appeared there a long time... " and that " [t]his beard was black, which he suffered to grow
of an extravagant length; as to breadth, it came up to his eyes. He was accustomed to twist it with
ribbons, in small tails, after the manner of our Ramillies wigs, and turn them about his ears" Id. at 57).
5. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Scourges of the Sea: Piracy and Violent Maritime Crime, 1 MARITIME
POLICY REPORTS 13 (1989) [hereinafter Menefee (1989a)] (circa 1948-1903 B.C.).
6. Id., noting:
King Minos of Crete is traditionally believed to have swept the sea of pirates, Herodotus and
other Greeks report the kidnappings engineered by Phonecian seafarers, while Odysseus
himself was queried on his travels as to whether he was trader or pirate. Julius Caesar hunted
down and executed the mariners who had seized and held him to ransom, and Pompey the
Great exterminated many of their fellows.
(Footnotes omitted). See also RALPH T. WARD, PIRATES IN HISTORY 4-44 (1974); PHILIP GOSSE, THE
HISTORY OF PIRACY 301-08 (1946); HENRY A. ORMEROD, PIRACY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD: AN ESSAY
IN MEDITERRANEAN HISTORY (1924).
7. Menefee (1989a), supra note 5, at 13 (footnote omitted). See also WARD, supra note 6,at 63-64,
77-88, 160-73; GOSSE, supra note 6, at 88-90, 254-90, 323-26.
8. See PHILIP GOSSE, THE PIRATES' WHO'S WHO: GIVING PARTICULARS OF THE LIVES & DEATHS
OFTHE PIRATES & BUCCANEERS 117-18,222-28, 175-76, 187-88 (1968) (covering Drake, Morgan, Jones,
and Lafitte, respectively); Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Piracy, Terrorism, and the Insurgent Passenger: A
Historical and Legal Perspective, in MARITIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 43, at 47-50, 56-58
(Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1990) [hereinafter Menefee (1990a)] (covering Hogg and Galvao, respectively).
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attorneys, may not differ in what is or is not to be included. The same
evidence viewed in different contexts may lead to strikingly different
conclusions. Take, for example, the idea of treating the slave trade as a
form of piracy. This position has been advocated by individuals in both the
United States and the United Kingdom; statutes and diplomatic evidence
might suggest that slavers are pirates, but most commentators feel that the
case for this has not been made. 9 Similarly, in the interwar years, the
attempt to analogize certain attacks on vessels, particularly by submarines,
to "acts of piracy" in the Washington Declaration of 1922 and the Nyon
Agreement of 1937 "have subsequently been roundly criticized as unjustifi-
able and inappropriate extensions of the concept."' l The idea of "air
piracy" may prove to be an extension of the basic concept or perhaps only
another inappropriate usage."
One problem of the developing international law of piracy concerns the
significance of the definition found in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas and repeated, almost verbatim, in the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea. This was that piracy consists of
1. Any illegal acts of violence, detention [the 1982 Convention reads
"acts of violence or detention"] or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
a. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
or property on board such ship or aircraft;
b. against a ship, aircraft, person or property in a place outside thejurisdiction of any State;
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
3. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
. . . [above]. 12
9. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The New "Jamaica Discipline": Problems with Piracy, Maritime
Terrorism and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 134-36 (1990)
[hereinafter Menefee (1990b)]. See also C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
416, 420 (1962); ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 147-50 (1988).
10. Menefee (1989a), supra note 5, at 14. See also P.W. Bimie, Piracy Past, Present and Future,
in PIRACY AT SEA 131, 137 (Eric Ellen ed., 1989); Raoul Genet, The Charge of Piracy in the Spanish
Civil War in 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 253-54 (1938); Comment, The Nyon Arrangements: Piracy by Treaty?,
19 BR. YaK. INT'L L. 208 (1938).
11. See Menefee (1989a), supra note 5, at 14; EDWARD MCWHINNEY, AERIAL PIRACY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed., 1987); NANCY DOUGLAS JOYNER, AERIAL HIJACKING AS AN INTERNATION-
AL CRIME (1974).
12. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 15, 13 U.S.T. 2312; 450 U.N.T.S. 82. See
also Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. DOC.
A.CONF. 62/122, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES INDEX (1983).
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Two general sets of problems occur in relation to this definition, which, for
ease of treatment, may be termed micro and macro. The former deal with
issues of textual interpretation, while the latter consider wider problems
beyond the four corners of the treaty documents. The micro problems have
been discussed elsewhere at length;' 3 here, it is only necessary to summarize
the five major issues they encompass.
First, there is the question of whether "illegal acts" are to be determined
under national or international law. The former could produce discrepancies
in enforcement, while the latter might restrict the statute's coverage.'
4
Second, the conventions require that the relevant acts be committed for
"private ends." While this is nowhere defined, it seems clear that if the term
excludes political seizures, most, if not all, acts of maritime terrorism might
be left untouched. At the same time, it is clear the exception could swallow
the rule, particularly if the actors are allowed to characterize their own
actions-the possibility that acts may have both public and private motives
is not considered.' 5 To give but one example, Burley's Case involved the
Confederate hijack of a northern steamer, the Philo Parsons, on Lake Erie.
In the subsequent trial, it was found that Burley's robbery of a $20 note from
the ship's clerk "constituted an act against a non-combatant involving a
violation of neutral territory and was, therefore, not a lawful act of war. ,
1 6
The court further declined to give effect to the Confederate commission
which not only had been issued to Burley before the seizure, but had been
endorsed "ex post facto by Jefferson Davis himself, 'declaring that the
enterprise. . . was a belligerent expedition ordered and undertaken under the
authority of the Confederate government and for which that government
assumed responsibility .... ,"7 "Private ends" comes from the traditional
conceptions of piracy involving either actions for gain or those committed
with animo furandi-a willful desire to inflict injury on others. Nonprivate
ends are not specifically defined, but it is accepted that these included actions
undertaken under color of a lawful privateering commission issued by a
recognized power.' 8 In the 19th century, the major issues would have been
the legitimacy of the power granting the commission and whether the actions
considered went beyond its terms. 19 Today, with the demise of privateering,
13. See Menefee (1990a), supra note 9, at 141-48.
14. See Menefee (1990b), supra note 9, at 142.
15. See Menefee (1990b), supra note 9, at 142-43; Menefee (1990a), supra note 8. at 60.
16. Menefee (1990a), supra note 8, at 53. See also JUDITH BASSETr MOORE, EXTRADmON AND
INTERSTATE RENDITION 319-20 (n.p. 1891).
17. Menefee (1990a), supra note 8, at 53; see also MOORE, supra note 16, at 320.
18. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, 89, 1 Stat. 112 (An Act for the punishment of certain crimes
against the United States) (which considers piracy by a U.S. citizen under color of a foreign commission);
Act of Mar. 3, 1847, 9 Stat. 175 (An Act to provide for the Punishment of Piracy in certain Cases)
(dealing with privateers acting against the United States contrary to the provisions of a treaty between the
United States and their country of nationality); Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, "Yo Heave Ho!": Updating
America's Piracy Laws, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 151, at 153-54, 158, 163-65 and notes therein (1990)
[hereinafter Menefee (1990c)].
19. See generally RUBIN, supra note 9, at 154-62.
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the problem of demonstrating a non-private end is compounded, not only by
the exercise of maritime terrorism by national liberation and separatist
groups, but also by environmentally-motivated actions which are not easily
categorized.'
A third micro problem has variously been termed the "internal seizure"
issue or the "one ship/two ships controversy."21 Under the convention, a
piratical act on the high seas must be directed "against another ship or
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or air-
craft. . . . "22 Many have argued that this inserts a requirement that two
ships be involved for any action to qualify as piracy.' The counter-response
is that the definition also classifies piracy as an act "against a ship, aircraft,
persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State." 4 As
the high seas would obviously qualify as being outside national jurisdiction,
this would be held to support the view that acts on a single ship might still
qualify?25 Unfortunately, the twist in clause structure, emphasizing the place
in the first instance, and the target in the second, leaves it unclear which was
to receive primary emphasis.'
Fourth, we have further problems with jurisdiction. What happens when
a state asserts excessive jurisdictional claims-like a 200-mile territorial
sea-which are not recognized by others?27 Another question is the effect
of exclusive economic zones allowed under the later, 1982 Convention.
"[T]he redefinition of high seas ... to exclude economic zones and
archipelagic waters substantially reduced theoretical jurisdiction over piracy
as defined in international law.'" Article 58 of the new Convention
allows application of the high seas piracy articles (among others) "insofar as
they are not incompatible" with the Exclusive Economic Zone section (Part
5), but this leaves open the possibility that a different type of regime might
be held to apply to the area.29 The meanings of "voluntary participations"
"inciting" or "intent . . ." are a fifth micro problem area; it is unclear in the
20. See Menefee (1990c), supra note 18, at 163-64; Menefee (1990b), supra note 9, at 142-43.
21. See Menefee (1990b), supra note 9, at 144. See also Menefee (1990a), supra note 8, at 60.
22. See supra text at note 12 (italics added).
23. See 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 970-73 (1989); RUBIN, supra
note 9, at 322-23.
24. See supra note 12.
25. See Menefee (1990b), supra note 9, at 144; Menefee (1990a), supra note 8, at 60; Samuel Pyeatt
Menefee, The Achille Lauro and Similar Incidents as Piracy: Two Arguments, in PIRACY AT SEA, supra
note 10, at 179 [hereinafter Menefee (1989b)].
26. See Menefee (1990a), supra note 8, at 68 n.199.
27. See Menefee (1990b), supra note 9, at 145.
28. Menefee, Forward [sic], in International Maritime Bureau, A Third Report into the Incidence of
Piracy and Armed Robbery From Merchant Ships [ii] (Oct. 1985). See also Menefee (1990b), supra note
9, at 145-46; Menefee (1989a), supra note 5, at 15; Birnie, supra note 10, at 141.
29. See Menefee (1990b), supra note 9, at 146; Thomas A. Clingan Jr., The Law of Piracy, in
PIRACY AT SEA, supra note 10, at 168-70.
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absence of textual definitions whether external international definitions or
municipal ones are to control.30
Having considered these five subdivisions, we may turn to the macro
problems of the Convention definitions, which are to be found outside the
given text of the document. The major question is to what extent the 1958
Convention and its 1982 successor provide exclusive definitions of "piracy"
in international law. As the '82 Convention is not yet in force, states which
have ratified or acceded are only obliged to act in a way not inconsistent with
the terms of the treaty,3 and the problem of course would not arise under
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas for any state not a party.32 As the
United States has ratified the 1958 Convention,33 it must be asked whether
the Convention, which allegedly codified the law on the subject, should
therefore be considered the exclusive definition of piracy jure gentium, piracy
under international law.
No less an authority than D.P. O'Connell, author of The International
Law of the Sea, has noted that "the question is open whether it [Article 15]
is comprehensive so as to preclude reliance upon customary international
. ..law . . ."I" and again "[p]iracy remains a difficult legal concept, partly
because of doubts as to the inclusiveness of the definition in Article 15 of the
Geneva Convention of the High Seas.. . " If the 1958 Convention does
not encapsulate the full definition of piracy, prior (and subsequent) incidents
may be reviewed to see what other matters may be included, and how these
augment the treaty definition. This process has previously been followed to
analyze a series of political passenger attacks on vessels, including the
Cagliari takeover of 1857,36 several Civil War seizures (the Joseph L.
30. See Menefee (1990b), supra note 9, at 147; Menefee (1989a), supra, note 5, at 15; Birnie, supra
note 10, at 140.
31. According to art. 308 of the convention, the treaty will enter into force twelve months after the
deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession. This occurred on November 16, 1993.
Parties to date include Angola, Antigua and Barbada, Barbados, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Botswana,
Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt,
Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq,
Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of),
Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
32. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 12. Parties include Afghanistan, Albania, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Byelorssia, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti,
Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Switzerland, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad &
Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. See
TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE:
A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON
JANUARY 1, 1992, at 350. Notably absent are Iran and most of the Arab world.
33. On April 12, 1961. See INDEX OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 135 (P.
De Cesari et al. eds., 1985).
34. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 23, at 970. See also Menefee (1990a), supra note 8, at 61; Menefee
(1989b), supra note 25, at 180.
35. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 23, at 966. See also Menefee (1990a), supra note 8, at 61.
36. See Menefee (1990a), supra note 8, at 43-47.
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Gerrity [In Re Tivnan],37 the Salvador and Guatemala,3" the Chesapeake,39
the Philo Parsons [Burley's Case],' and the Roanoke4t), the takeover of the
Spanish steamer Montezuma by Cuban insurgents in 1876,42 the seizure of the
S. S. Falke in 1929 by Venezuelan revolutionaries4 3 and the commandeering
of the Portuguese cruise liner Santa Maria in 1961," which, taken together,
offer support for treating the Achille Lauro hijackers as pirates under
international law. 5 A newer problem, however, is that of maritime
environmental attacks. This will be considered in general, with the case of
the Castle John being reviewed in particular as a potential example of
"environmental piracy."
ENVIRONMENTALLY-INSPIRED MARITIME ATTACKS: SOME EXAMPLES
It is somewhat disconcerting for most of us to view "environmentalism"
and "extremist violence" as intersecting sets. While marine environmental
terrorism has been discussed elsewhere,' a review of several examples
should indicate that a potential problem does exist. Because of its general
notoriety, and the probability that events at the 1992 IWC meeting have
made further incidents more likely,47 the so-called "Whale Wars" will be
considered first. In 1978, the F.B.I. raided the home of James Rose, a
Miami diver and arrested him for the interstate transportation of explosives.
They subsequently recovered a two-man (yellow) submarine, several pictures
of the Soviet and Japanese whaling fleet in Talcahuano, Chile, three hundred
pounds of plastic explosives, one hundred and fifty electronic blasting caps,
37. Id. at 47-49.
38. Id. at 49-50.
39. Id. at 51-52.
40. Id. at 52-53.
41. Id. at 53-54.
42. Id. at 54-55.
43. Id. at 55-56.
44. Id. at 56-58.
45. See id. at 59 ("Almost without exception, the issue of piracy has been raised in connection with
vessel seizure by pirates.").
46. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, "'Green Terror' at Sea: The Unrecognized Threat of Marine
Ecological Terrorism" (unpublished manuscript on file with California Western International Law
Journal.) [hereinafter Menefee (ms)]; Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Maritime Terror in Europe and the
Mediterranean, 12 MAR. POL. 143, at 146 (1988) [hereinafter Menefee (1988)]; Samuel Pyeatt Menefee,
"Any Port in a Storm": The Worldwide Threat to Port Security, in PORTS AT RISK 248, 277-78 (Eric F.
Ellen ed., 1993) [hereinafter Menefee (1993)].
47. Since the actual delivery of this paper to the University of San Diego's Oxford Institute on
International and Comparative Law at Magdalen College, Oxford on July 7, 1992, this prediction has been
justified by the December, 1992 sinking of the Norwegian whaler Nybraena for which the Sea Shepherd
group has claimed responsibility. See Kate Williams, Noted environmentalist explains radical techniques,
The Cavalier Daily (Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va,) at 7 (Mar. 29, 1993); Charles Moore, Sea
Shepherd founder callsfor care, activism, The University Journal (Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.)
1, at 5 (Mar. 30, 1993).
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and 3,000 feet of shaped charges.'8 The plot-which incidentally appears to
have been based on a 1976 novel, Leviathan-was to damage the ships and
thus help to prevent commercial whaling.49 "According to individuals with
direct knowledge of the details, 'the money came from an international
environment organization involved in the bitter fight over commercial
whaling. But these sources could not name the group.'" '
In June 1979, Paul Watson, skipper of the Sea Shepherd (and founder
of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society) deliberately rammed the whaler
Sierra outside Oporto harbor. Although Watson claims that, "I did not want
to hurt anyone .. because I oppose causing injury to any living thing,"51
he has also written that his intention was to cut the whaler in half.52 Subse-
quently he noted, "We rammed her good and proper ... I hope the owners
of all other ... whaling ships will take note. I'll do the same to them.'" 53
In December 1979, the Ibsa Uno and lbsa Tres, two Spanish whalers, were
slightly damaged by magnetic mines in Corcobian Bay.' On February 5/6th
of the same year, the Sierra, undergoing repairs in Lisbon, was sunk by a
magnetic mine. 5 On April 27, it was the turn of the Ibsa Uno and the Ibsa
Dos in Marin Harbor near Vigo, Spain.56 While crew members of Sea
Shepherd claimed to have set at least one of the mines, other sources state
that "[t]he bombers were professionals with military training and military
explosives"-basically mercenaries. 7 In 1980, and again in 1981, a posted
reward of $25,000 was offered to anyone who could sink one, of the "pirate
whalers" still operating in the Atlantic or off South America. 51 In Novem-
ber, 1986, the icelandic whalers Hvalur 6 and Hvalur 7 were sunk in
48. See Menefee (ms), supra note 46; Tom Mathews & Ron Sympson, A Whale of a Tale,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 1978, at 35; Bill Richards, Whale War, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1978, at A-i;
Menefee (1993), supra note 46, at 277.
49. See JOHN GORDON DAVIS, LEVIATHAN (1976); Menefee (ms), supra note 46; Samuel Pyeatt
Menefee, "'Terror by the Book': Fiction's Influence on Maritime Violence," (unpublished manuscript on
file with California Western International Law Journal.) (Paper delivered to I.C.C.-International Maritime
Bureau, Barking, Essex, England, May 8, 1989).
50. Menefee (ms), supra note 46; Richards, supra note 48, at A-i. See also Menefee (1993), supra
note 46, at 277.
51. Menefee (ms), supra note 46; PAUL WATSON, SEA SHEPHERD: MY FIGHT FOR WHALES AND
SEALS 230-31 (1982) (as told to Warren Rogers).
52. See Menefee (ms), supra note 46; WATSON, supra note 51, at 231-33.
53. Menefee (ms), supra note 46; A Pirate Whaler Meets Its Match, NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1979, at
60.
54. See Menefee (ms), supra note 46; DAVID DAY, THE WHALE WAR 62-63 (1987); Menefee (1988),
supra note 46, at 146; Menefee (1993), supra note 46, at 277.
55. See Menefee (ms), supra note 46; WATSON, supra note 51, at 247-50; DAY, supra note 54, at
57-58; Menefee (1988), supra 46, at 146; Menefee (1993), supra note 46, at 277.
56. See Menefee (ms), supra note 46; DAY, supra note 54, at 63-64; WATSON, supra note 51, at 250;
Menefee (1988), supra 146; Menefee (1993), supra note 46, at 277.
57. See Philip Shebecoff, Rusty Trawler toLead Battle Against Whale Hunters, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
1981, § 1, pt. 1, at 1; DAY, supra note 54, at 63-64; Menefee (1988), supra note 46, at 146; Menefee
(1993), supra, note 46, at 277.
58. See Menefee (ms), supra note 46; WATSON, supra note 51, at 250; DAY, supra note 54, at 61;
Paul Hodge, Champion of Whales Charts New Voyage, WASH. POST, May 28, 1981, at 6.
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Reyjavik Harbor when their sea cocks were opened. 9 Subsequently, other
threats have been issued, and most recently, a Norwegian whaler was scuttled
in December of 1992. 60  This summation presents the highlights, but
certainly not the totality of whaling-related attack.
A similar series of less-spectacular incidents is related to the maritime
transportation and dumping of toxic wastes. In early 1980, for example,
Greenpeace defied a British high court order forbidding the Rainbow Warrior
from interfering with the unloading of nuclear fuel to be reprocessed from
the Pacific Fisher.6' In May of the same year, Greenpeace staged a three-day
blockade of ships carrying Bayer AG waste, preventing this material from
being dumped at sea.62 One month later a group of environmental protesters,
at least one of whom was subsequently a member of the European terrorist
group, the Fighting Communist Cells (CCC), boarded the Andrea Smits
(which carried nuclear waste) and smashed $700,000 worth of radio and
navigation equipment. Several protesters were hurt in the melde and there
were eight arrests.63 In July of 1981, activists interfered with dumping from
the Gem at a site off Land's End in Cornwall. 6' Action by Greenpeace in
August of 1982 resulted in members storming the Gem with grappling hooks
and chaining themselves to dumping platforms.
As a result, the Dutch nuclear authorities and the UKAEA resorted to the
courts. An injunction was upheld in British courts preventing Greenpeace
Netherlands from interfering with the dump, but it was acknowledged to
be difficult to enforce. So in September the UKAEA went to the
Netherlands and gained a partial victory in the courts there. The court
recognized Greenpeace's right to carry out protests at the dump site but not
its right to make the dumping impossible or to board the dumping Vessel.
A fine of £2,000 would be levied for each day the organization failed to
comply.6
Although the Dutch ships were accompanied to the limit of Belgian coastal
waters by a naval vessel, harassment by Greenpeace activists continued.
Volunteers again boarded a dumping vessel-the Rijnborg-and chained
themselves to the dumping cranes.' As a result, these individuals were
arrested and locked up by the ship's captain on the authority of a Dutch
59. See Menefee (ins), supra note 46; DAY, supra note 55, at 132-33; Charles Fenyveski, A militant
turn for conservationists, 101 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 24, 1986, at 72; Menefee (1988),
supra note 46, at 146; Menefee, (1993), supra note 46, at 277.
60. See Menefee (ins), supra note 46; Menefee (1988), supra note 46, at 146; supra note 47.
61. See Menefee (ins), supra note 46; MICHAEL BROWN & JOHN MAY, THE GREENPEACE STORY 63
(2d ed. 1991).
62. See BROWN & MAY, supra note 61, at 69.
63. See Menefee (ins); Paul Taylor, Police on Guerrillas' Trail, Fear Attack During Pope Trip, May
14, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Gary Yerkey, On nuclear wastes and international waters,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 15, 1981 (Midwestern ed.), at 16, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library); Menefee (1988), supra note 46, at 146.
64. See BROWN & MAY, supra note 61, at 76-77.
65. See BROWN & MAY, supra note 61, at 83. See also Menefee (ns), supra note 46.
66. See Menefee (ins), supra note 46; BROWN & MAY, supra note 61, at 83.
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public prosecutor. An attorney representing the Belgian and Dutch Central
Energy Agencies referred to the protest as "an act of modern piracy" and
said that he would continue to seek an injunction against further inter-
ference.67 The disruption of navigation-by chaining individuals this time to
an anchor chain-was also used against a dumping barge in the United
States. 6s
In 1984, two Greenpeace members were arrested after stowing away
aboard the Clydebank, carrying a cargo of uranium oxides from Australia,69
while halfway around the world a barge involved in dumping gypsum sludge
off LeHavre was "sprayed with paint, occupied and immobilized .. "70
Similar actions have continued, with ships being occupied individuals
chaining themselves aboard ships, and other forms of disruption being
practiced.7 Many of these are chronicled in the book The Greenpeace Story,
by Michael Brown and John May.' One incident, which is largely ignored,
will form the basis of subsequent consideration.
CASTLE JOHN AND NEDERLANDSE STICHTING SIRIUS V.
Nv MABVECO AND NV PARFIN
The entire factual background given for this case in The Greenpeace
Story-the legal action itself is not mentioned-is as follows. On April 26,
1985,
Greenpeace began an extensive campaign against NL Chemicals of Ghent
and Bayer of Antwerp, who were freshly licensed by the Belgian govern-
ment to dump titanium dioxide waste in the North Sea. Greenpeace
activists boarded the NL Chemicals dump ship Falco on two occasions, and
the Sirius was later used to blockade the passage of Bayer's dump ship the
Wadsy Tanker in Antwerp harbour. As a result, Bayer claimed damages
against Greenpeace and the Belgian authorities confiscated the Sirius at thebeginning of May.b
The court records state that during an eleven-day period (April 25-May
5) dinghies from the Sirius accosted the M.S. Falco and Wadsy Tanker in
67. See Menefee (ms), supra note 46.
68. See BROWN & MAY, supra note 61, at 85, 87.
69. See id. at 103.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 112 (Feb. 25, 1985; blockade of the Essi Flora); 129 (Sept. 21, 1985; blockade of
Clydebank); id. at 134 (May 17, 1986; boarding Mediterranean Shearwater and occupation of crane); id.
at 134 (Aug. 13, 1986; blocking of discharge pipes of the Nerva and the Niebla); id. at 135 (November,
1986; blockade of Forthbank); id. at 129 (1986; blockade of Vulcanus II); id. at 149 (May 31, 1988;
disruption of operations on the MV Kronos); id. at 151-52 (June 21, 1988; attempted boarding of
Vulcanus H).
72. See id. at 132-55 (a chronology of Greenpeace actions from February, 1986-March, 1989);
Menefee (ms), supra note 46.
73. BROWN & MAY, supra note 61, at 120. Greenpeace did not respond to an inquiry of June 18,
1992 for information on the incident.
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Antwerp harbor and on the open sea in the Scheldt.74 Activists from the
dinghies dived in front of the bows or in the immediate vicinity of the
dumping vessels, attached themselves to the ships' discharge pipes, painted
over the windows on the bridge, and threatened to drop the anchors.75
Additionally the Sirius itself impeded the passage of the Wadsy Tanker from
the Van Cauwelaertslvis dock in Antwerp.76 Taken together, these activities
had the cumulative effect of preventing the Falco and Wadsy Tanker from
proceeding to fully discharge their cargos. 77
The legal action was based on the Greenpeace campaign against the
Falco and the Wadsy Tanker, which involved "boarding, occupying and
causing damage to the two vessels." s7 An initial hearing, before a Summa-
ry Sitting in the First Instance, concluded that
defendants' refusal to give an undertaking to refrain from
similar actions in the future and then to continue their campaign (as
evidenced by a published news report) resulted in actual danger to
the plaintiff and the intervenor;79
one defendant was a foundation existing under Dutch law
with its corporate headquarters in the Netherlands and that the Sirius
was a Dutch ship;' and that
on the high seas, vessels are exclusively subject to the legal
authority of their flag state (in this case, the Netherlands).8
Since the action would effectively forbid the defendants from carrying
on their campaign against the dumpers in Belgian territory and in territorial
waters, the court concluded that it was necessary to determine whether such
conduct was an acceptable form of expression in modem society.' Here the
court noted that the Belgium constitution guarantees freedom of expression,
not only by speech, but by conduct,83 and that the defendants' right to
engage in demonstrative conduct in order to influence public opinion and
gain support for their campaign is thus putatively protected even if this
74. See M.S. WADY TANKER, M.S. SiRius N.V. MABECO, N.V. PARFIN V. I J. Castle 2 Ned.
Stichting Smius, e.a., 20 European Transport Law 536, at 44. Summary hearing of Court of First
Instance; June 12, 1985) [hereinafter M.S. WADY TANKER].
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. CASTLE JOHN AND NEDERLANDSE STICHTING SIRIUS V. NV MARJLO AND NV PARFIN, 77 INT'L
L.R. 537. Court of Cassation; December 19, 1986 [hereinafter CASTLE JOHN].
79. See M.S. WADY TANKER, supra note 78, at 545.
80. See id.
81. See id.; CASTLE JOHN, supra note 78, at 537.
82. See M.S. WADY TANKER, supra note 74, at 545.
83. See id.
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causes damage (unlawful damage to be recompensed by the defendants).'
The Greenpeace vessels, however, went too far in preventing the dumpers
from leaving the harbor in accordance with the required permit and in those
actions which violated accepted navigational practices.'
For these reasons, the court of first instance declared the claims were
admissible. The court held itself without legal authority to the extent that
actions occurred on the high seas, but declared the remaining parts of the
complaint were well founded. It prohibited the defendants from engaging in
any conduct hindering the free passage of the dumping vessels from their
point of departure or in their navigation within Belgian territory or territorial
waters, when such conduct would risk safety or lives. If Greenpeace did not
honor the judgment, the defendants were to be subject to the payment of a
penalty of 500,000 francs to the plaintiff or the intervenor-approximately
$15,000 in current value.'
On appeal to the Court of Appeal at Antwerp' the question of urgency
was again noted, there being a serious danger to the appellants (plaintiffs in
the court of first instance) that they would be victims of similar conduct,
prevented from carrying out their lawful activities, and subject to risk. In
considering general capacity, the court declared that even though the protest
actions were for conservation, the end cannot justify the mean adopted.
Damage to vessels is subject to the Criminal Code and conduct may be
illegal even if it is not covered by a specific criminal provision. Here,
freedom of navigation is guaranteed in the Scheldt by the Vienna Convention
of 1815 and in the territorial waters and on the high seas by the Geneva
Conventions of 1958 and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.88
Turning to the question of exclusive flag state jurisdiction on the High
Seas, enunciated by the court of first instance, the Court of Appeal noted that
this was applicable with reference to the exercise of police powers over
navigation. States, however, have undertaken to intervene when provisions
of treaties or rules of customary international law are infringed, using
warships or ships in government service. Thus, exceptions do exist to the
exclusive power of the flag state.8 9 The threatened actions on the high seas
involved conduct which would fall under the definition of piracy as defined
by Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the high seas.' Accord-
ing to the Court:
84. See id.
85. See id. at 545-46.
86. See id. at 546 (Prof. D.J. Devine has supplied the monetary equivalent).
87. See id. at 536 (Antwerp Court of Appeal; July 19, 1985).
88. See id. at 540-41.
89. See id. at 542. See also CASTLE JOHN, supra note 78, at 538.
90. See M.S. WADY TANKER, supra note 74, at 542; CASTLE JOHN, supra note 78, at 538. For the
text of Article 15, see supra text at note 12.
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It appears from the facts available that, at the time of their action against
the Wadsy Tanker and the Falco, the applicants resorted to "violence"....
The actions in question were committed for personal ends, in furtherance
of ... [their] objects. Furthermore, more personal motivation such as
hatred, the desire for vengeance and the wish to take justice into their own
hands are not excluded in this case. There is no provision of municipal or
international law which imposes restrictions on the competence of the
Belgian courts, in relation to their own nationals to take measures to
protect their free right of passage and their lawful activities and even if
necessary to pronounce a civil sanction to ensure respect for the freedoms
granted to all persons. 91
The actions of the defendants were committed for private ends, here the
achievement of their group or corporate goals. Indeed the Court felt that
more personal motivations could not be excluded. 9' As the nature of the
actions was held to qualify, and the "private ends" test was met, the Court
of Appeal found that jurisdiction conferred by the piracy provisions applied.
It therefore ordered the defendants to refrain from all conduct wherever
committed, hindering or obstructing the freedom of navigation or the
discharge of wastes. Further, those ignoring the court's ruling were to be
fined the sum of 1,000,000 francs-approximately $30,000 at current
rates-for any twenty-four hour period or part thereof during which there
was noncompliance, and trial and appellate costs were assessed against
Greenpeace.93
The result of this appellate decision was a second appeal by Greenpeace,
with a resulting judgment delivered by the Court of Cassation on December
19, 1986. 4 In bringing this case to the Court of Cassation, the appellant
felt that its actions did not involve piracy, as they were not committed "for
private ends." According to this argument
action which impedes, threatens, prevents, or makes more difficult the
discharge at sea of waste products which are harmful for the environment,
taken with a view to alerting public opinion, cannot be considered as
having been committed "for private ends" merely because that aim
corresponds with the objects set out in the articles of association (objet
social) of the applicant. The consideration that personal motives such as
hatred, the desire for vengeance or the wish to take justice into their own
hands "are not excluded" in this case, is insufficient in law to deduce the
existence of "personal ends." Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the Belgian
courts with regard to Belgian nationals on the high seas is insufficient for
91. CASTLE JOHN, supra note 78, at 538-39. See also M.S. WADY TANKER, supra note 74, at 542.
The Court of Appeal noted that violence was included among the actions undertaken by the defendant
against the Wady Tanker and the Falco. This consisted not only of material deeds such as boarding,
painting the vessels, making threats with a knife, detaching the cable used for dumping and sawing
through it, but also included moral pressure on the crews, such as threats to throw themselves across the
bow, the presence of divers in the water, and threats to loose the anchors, all of which could be labeled
as forms of violence. See id.
92. See M.S. WADY TANKER, supra note 74, at 542.
93. See id. at 543 (monetary equivalent supplied by Prof. D.J. Devine).
94. CASTLE JOHN, supra note 78, at 537.
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the imposition on the high seas of prohibitive measures on ships sailing
under a foreign flag.'
In considering, and rejecting, this contention, the Court of Cassation
noted that:
The applicants do not argue that the acts at issue were committed in
the interest or to the detriment of a State or a State system rather than
purely in support of a personal point of view concerning a particular
problem, even if they reflected a political perspective.
On the basis of these considerations the Court of Appeal was entitled
to decide that the acts at issue were committed for personal ends within the
meaning.. .of the Conventionjon the High Seas]. The ground of appeal
is therefore unfounded in law.a
CASTLE JOHN: NAVIGATIONAL BEACON OR DEAD END?
Castle John, therefore, stands for the proposition that maritime
environmental violence may qualify as piracy under international law.
Whether this view is subsequently accepted or ultimately becomes an
evolutionary dead end in the development of the concept will depend upon
a number of factors.
First, sufficient opportunities must arise for similar decisions to be made,
so that cases and/or customary practice point to general acceptance of the
inclusion of acts of environmental maritime violence under the general rubric
of piracy. This presupposes that competing views over ocean uses (such as
dumping and whaling) will continue to produce actions categorizable as "acts
of violence." The background given to the Castle John case, coupled with
other developments, such as the split at the Glasgow IWC Conference, makes
it likely that the opportunities for such decisions will continue to be
generated.
The next, and more important criterion, however, is one of universality.
Given the chance for decision, will it generally be held that environmental
violence at sea is a form of piracy? Here, it is not as clear that the necessary
majority will be found. The Belgian Court of Cassation, in setting up a
private-public ends dichotomy, appears to have taken a restrictive view of the
latter concept, noting that "public ends" are "in the interest or to the
detriment of a State or State system," and differentiating those cases
involving "a personal point of view concerning a particular problem, even
if they [the acts involved] reflected a political perspective. "I Other
countries, judging other cases, might prefer the argument that if a particular
nation allows commercial whaling or permits dumping at sea, that an
environmental act undertaken against private whalers or dumpers is
95. Id. at 539.
96. Id. at 540.
97. See supra text at note 95.
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nonetheless not for private ends if it serves to challenge these public policies.
Taken to its logical extreme, the Court's implication that formalized state or
anti-state action is necessary to show that an incident does not merely result
from "a personal point of view reflecting a political perspective" would tend
to mean that almost every nongovernmental act of violence could arguably
be classified as piracy. In retrospect, the court might have given more useful
guidance in defining what was a private end rather than doing this indirectly
by saying what was not a "public" end. Muddied definitions do not, in the
long term, make for clear and consistent court decisions.
Two external factors also lessen the likelihood that the Castle John
represents a turning point in the international definition of piracy. The first
is the reluctance of some countries to face up to the problem of piracy at all;
in Nigeria, for example, which was a hotbed of port attacks during the
1970's and early 1980's, a conference on "Coastal Piracy" was held in which
speaker after speaker, relying exclusively on the definition of the internation-
al crime, rather than the definition of piracy under municipal law, insisted
(quite rightly, of course) that (international) piracy did not exist within
Nigerian waters. 9 This was undoubtedly true, as both the '58 and '82
conventions require a locus on the high seas or in a place outside national
jurisdiction. Other countries have shown a similar reluctance to use the
crime in their prosecutions. Vincent Buglosi, the author of Helter Skelter,
has recently written a book And the Sea Will Tell, covering the murder of a
yachting couple on Palmyra Atoll in the Pacific and the resulting court
case. 99 It is interesting that while the American law of piracy obviously
applied to the crime, and while the murder was (for once) accurately
characterized as piracy in the popular press, that the charges brought against
the alleged perpetrators nowhere included a count of piracy. If the United
States is reluctant to prosecute incidents which obviously come under the
classic definition of the term, it would appear even less likely that courts will
be willing to stretch the definition to include environmental acts. This in
turn makes it doubtful that the international conformity necessary for
customary international law will be found to exist.
A second factor which makes the redefinition of piracy unlikely is the
existence of a new alternate ground of prosecution, which was unavailable
a the time the Castle John. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, drafted in response to the
achille Lauro hijacking has now entered into force; its provisions allow
98. See SMUGGLING AND "COASTAL PIRACY" IN NIGERIA: PROCEEDINGS ON A WORKSHOP (R.A.
Akindele & M.A. Vogt eds., 1983).
99. See VINCENT BUGLOSI, WITH BRUCE B. HENDERSON, AND THE SEA WILL TELL (1991).
100. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
Rome, March 10, 1988, entered into force March 1, 1992. Countries which have ratified or acceded to
the agreement include Austria, China, France, Gambia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Oman, Poland, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad & Tobago, and United Kingdom. See I INSTITUTE
OF MARITIME LAW UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON, ENGLAND, THE RATIFICATION OF MARITIME
CONVENTIONS 1.3.110 (1990).
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for the trial or extradition of offenders, and the acts covered would generally
include all those thus far discussed under the general heading of environmen-
tal maritime violence. The very absence of emotive terms, such as "piracy"
and "maritime terrorism," makes it more likely that this convention will be
applied by ratifying or acceding States in appropriate environmental
contexts,1°1 and thus less likely that an expanded definition of international
piracy will come into use.
CONCLUSION
Examining the Castle John action in context has shown how the changing
definition of piracy relates to the development of international law particular-
ly in the interface between piracy and maritime environmental actions.
While the decision of the Court of Cassation does not appear to herald a new
trend in redefining the crime of piracy, it does suggest some of the problems
raised by increasing maritime environmental violence. If this review of a
contemporary problem and one possible solution makes us think further
about these issues, then Greenbeard the Pirate, like his less fictional
forebears, will have served his purpose.
101. See the discussion in Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro,
Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 274-77, 305-09 (1988).
Halberstarn notes that "[t]he Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation has several advantages, aside from obviating, in part, the need for resolving whether
terrorist acts constitute piracy ... ." Id. at 308 (footnote omitted).
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